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Fingerprinting is an essential tool to shun legal buyers of digital content from illegal redistribution. In fingerprinting schemes,
the merchant embeds the buyer’s identity as a watermark into the content so that the merchant can retrieve the buyer’s identity
when he encounters a redistributed copy. To prevent the merchant from dishonestly embedding the buyer’s identity multiple
times, it is essential for the fingerprinting scheme to be anonymous. Kuribayashi and Tanaka, 2005, proposed an anonymous
fingerprinting scheme based on a homomorphic additive encryption scheme, which uses basic quantization index modulation
(QIM) for embedding. In order, for this scheme, to provide suﬃcient security to the merchant, the buyer must be unable to remove
the fingerprint without significantly degrading the purchased digital content. Unfortunately, QIM watermarks can be removed by
simple attacks like amplitude scaling. Furthermore, the embedding positions can be retrieved by a single buyer, allowing for a
locally targeted attack. In this paper, we use robust watermarking techniques within the anonymous fingerprinting approach
proposed by Kuribayashi and Tanaka. We show that the properties of an additive homomorphic cryptosystem allow for creating
anonymous fingerprinting schemes based on distortion compensated QIM (DC-QIM) and rational dither modulation (RDM),
improving the robustness of the embedded fingerprints. We evaluate the performance of the proposed anonymous fingerprinting
schemes under additive-noise and amplitude-scaling attacks.
Copyright © 2007 J. P. Prins et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property protection is a severe problem in today’s
digital world due to the ease of illegal redistribution through
the Internet. As a countermeasure to deter people from il-
legally redistributing digital content such as audio, images,
and video, a fingerprinting scheme embeds specific informa-
tion related to the identity of the buyer by using watermark-
ing techniques. In conventional fingerprinting schemes, this
identity information is embedded into the digital data by the
merchant and the fingerprinted copy is given to the buyer.
When the merchant encounters redistributed copies of this
fingerprinted content, he can retrieve the identity informa-
tion of the buyer who (illegally) redistributed his copy. From
the buyer’s point of view, however, this scenario is unattrac-
tive because during the embedding procedure, the merchant
obtains the identity information of the buyer. This enables a
cheating merchant to embed the identity information of the
buyer into any content without the buyer’s consent and sub-
sequently accuse the buyer of illegal redistribution.
To protect the identity of the buyer, anonymous finger-
printing schemes have been proposed [1, 2]. In [2], the buyer
and the merchant follow an interactive embedding proto-
col, in which the identity information of the buyer remains
unknown to the merchant. When the buyer wishes to pur-
chase, for instance, an image, he registers himself to a reg-
istration centre and receives a proof of his identity with a
signature of the registration centre. Then the buyer encrypts
his identity and sends both encrypted identity and the proof
of identity to the merchant. The merchant checks the valid-
ity of the signature by using the public key of the registra-
tion centre. After the buyer convinces the merchant, through
the provided identity proof, that the encrypted identity in-
deed contains the identity information of the buyer, the mer-
chant embeds the identity information of the buyer into
the (encrypted) image data by exploiting the homomorphic
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property of the cryptosystem. Then the encrypted finger-
printed image is sent to the buyer for decryption and future
use.
In this scheme, the merchant can only retrieve the iden-
tity information of the buyer when it is detected in a copy
of the fingerprinted image. This idea, first presented in [2],
was constructed in [3, 4] using digital coins. In order to em-
bed the identity information of the buyer, a single-bit com-
mitment scheme with exclusive, or homomorphism, is used
that allows for computing the encrypted XOR of two bits by
multiplying their ciphertexts. In [5], Kuribayashi and Tanaka
observe that this construction is not eﬃcient because of the
low enciphering rate. The single bit commitment scheme can
only contain one bit of information for a log 2n-bit cipher-
text, where n is a product of two large primes.
In order to increase the enciphering rate, Kuribayashi and
Tanaka suggested using a cryptosystem with a larger mes-
sage space. They introduced an anonymous fingerprinting
algorithm based on an additive homomorphic cryptosystem
that allows for the addition of values in the plaintext do-
main by multiplying their corresponding ciphertexts. Con-
sequently, Kuribayashi and Tanaka used a basic amplitude
quantization-based scheme similar to the well-known quan-
tization index-modulation (QIM) scheme as the underly-
ing watermarking scheme. Since QIM essentially modulates
(integer-valued) quantization levels to embed information
bits into a signal, QIM can elegantly be implemented in an
additive homomorphic cryptosystem. However, QIM is a ba-
sic watermarking scheme that has limited robustness com-
pared to other watermarking schemes. The embedding po-
sitions can easily be retrieved from an individual finger-
printed copy and are thus vulnerable to local attacks. Such
attacks result in minimal overall signal degradation, while
completely removing the fingerprint. Furthermore, QIM is
vulnerable to simple, either malevolent or unintentional,
global attacks such as randomization of the least significant
bits, addition of noise, compression, and amplitude scal-
ing.
In this paper, we use the ideas in [5] to build anonymous
versions of state-of-the-art watermarking schemes, namely,
distortion-compensated QIM (DC-QIM) [6] and rational
dither modulation (RDM) [7]. By adapting these watermark-
ing schemes to the anonymous fingerprinting protocol of
Kuribayashi and Tanaka, we improve the robustness of the
embedded fingerprints and, as a consequence, the merchant’s
security. As DC-QIM and RDM are based on subtractive-
dither QIM (SD-QIM), they both hide the embedding lo-
cations from the buyer more eﬀectively, preventing local,
targeted attacks on the fingerprint. With respect to global
attacks, like additive noise and amplitude scaling, RDM is
provably equivalent in robustness, while DC-QIM is prov-
ably better in robustness against additive noise attacks. Fur-
thermore, RDM improves the QIM scheme so that the fin-
gerprint becomes robust to amplitude-scaling attacks.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce the basic QIM watermarking scheme, as well as the
additive homomorphic cryptosystem of Okamoto-Uchiyama
[8], on which the approach in [5] is based. In Section 3,
we review the anonymous fingerprinting scheme by Kurib-
Table 1: Table of symbols.
A.1. Cryptosystems
Symbol Usage





r, s∈RZ∗n r and s are random blinding factors from Z∗n
E(m) Encryption (and integer rounding) of m
D(c) Decryption of ciphertext c
A.2. Watermarking and fingerprinting
Symbol Usage
x/X Original sample/original signal
y/Y Watermarked sample/watermarked signal
z/Z Received sample/received signal
w/W Individual watermark bit/total watermark
d Dither
Δ Quantization step size




Scaling factor used for rounding/reducing quanti-
zation step size
v(·) Function to normalize coeﬃcients for RDM.
id Buyer identity
ayashi and Tanaka. In Section 4, we describe the proposed
anonymous fingerprinting schemes using the subtractive
dither QIM, DC-QIM, and RDM watermarking schemes.
Section 5 describes the experiments that evaluate the robust-
ness of the proposed schemes compared to the original wa-
termarking schemes. Section 6 discusses the security ben-
efits of using specially constructed buyer ids. Conclusions
are given in Section 7. A list of used symbols is provided in
Table 1.
2. WATERMARKING AND ENCRYPTION
PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Basic quantization-index modulation
Quantization-index modulation (QIM) is a relatively recent
watermarking technique [6]. It has become popular because
of the high watermarking capacity and the ease of implemen-
tation. The basic quantization-index modulation algorithm
embeds a watermark bit w by quantizing a single-signal sam-
ple x by choosing between a quantizer with even or odd
values, depending on the binary value of w. These quantiz-
ers with a step size Δ ∈ N are denoted by QΔ-even(·) and
QΔ-odd(·), respectively.
Figure 1 shows the input and output characteristics of the
quantizer, where w ∈ {0, 1} denotes the message bit that is







Figure 1: Quantizer input-output characteristics.




QΔ-even(x), if w = 0,
QΔ-odd(x), if w = 1. (1)
The quantizers QΔ-even(·) and QΔ-odd(·) are designed such
that they avoid biasing the values of y, that is, the expected
(average) value of x and y are identical. The trade-oﬀ be-
tween embedding distortion and robustness of QIM against
additive noise attacks is controlled by the value of Δ. The
detection algorithm requantizes the received signal sample
z with both QΔ-even(·) and QΔ-odd(·). The detected bit ŵ =
{0, 1} is determined by the quantized value QΔ-even(z) or
QΔ-odd(z) with the smallest distance to the received sample
z.
This scheme of even and odd quantizers can also be im-
plemented by using a single quantizer with a step-size of 2Δ
and subtracting/adding Δ when w = 1. Implementing the
quantizer in this way allows for the implementation of the
scheme in the encrypted domain as was shown in [5].
A serious drawback of basic QIM watermarking is its
sensitivity to amplitude-scaling attacks [7], in which signal
samples are multiplied by a gain factor ρ. If the gain fac-
tor ρ is constant for all samples, the attack is called a fixed-
gain attack (FGA). In amplitude-scaling attacks, the detector
does not posses the factor ρ, which causes a mismatch be-
tween embedder and decoder quantization lattices, aﬀecting
the QIM-detector performance dramatically.
Another drawback of basic QIM is that the embedding
positions can be retrieved from a single copy. The embedding
positions are those signal values xi that have been (heavily)
quantized to QΔ-even(xi) and QΔ-odd(xi), and have a constant
diﬀerence value equal to Δ, that is, the quantizer coarseness
parameter. By constructing a high-resolution histogram, the
buyer can easily observe the even-spaced spikes of signal in-
tensity values and identify, and thus attack the embedding
positions locally. This results in the removal of the finger-
print with little degradation to the overall signal.
2.2. Homomorphic encryption schemes
The idea of processing encrypted data was first suggested by
Ahituv et al. in [9]. In their paper, the problem of decrypt-
ing data before applying arithmetic operations is addressed
and a new approach is described as processing data without
decrypting it first.
Succeeding works showed that some asymmetric cryp-
tosystems preserve structure, which allows for arithmetic op-
erations to be performed on encrypted data. This structure
preserving property, called homomorphism, comes in two
main types, namely, additive and multiplicative homomor-
phism. Using additive homomorphic cryptosystems, per-
forming a particular operation (e.g., multiplication) with
encrypted data, results in the addition of the plaintexts.
Similarly, using a multiplicatively homomorphic cryptosys-
tem, multiplying ciphertexts, results in the multiplication
of the plaintexts. Paillier [10], Okamoto-Uchiyama [8], and
Goldwasser-Micali [11] are additively homomorphic cryp-
tosystems while RSA [12] and ElGamal [13] are multiplica-
tively homomorphic cryptosystems.
The anonymous fingerprinting scheme proposed in [5]
is based on the addition of the fingerprint to the digital
data, and hence, an additive cryptosystem is used. Among
the candidates, the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem is cho-
sen for eﬃciency considerations [5]. In the next section, the
Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem is described. We observe,
however, that the anonymous fingerprinting schemes, pro-
posed in this paper, can easily be implemented by using other
additively homomorphic cryptosystems. It is, however, re-
quired to have a suﬃciently large message space to represent
the signal samples. Further, the underlying security proto-
cols, such as the proof protocol for validating the buyer iden-
tity, must be suitable for the chosen cryptosystem.
A requirement for the cryptosystem is that it is proba-
bilistic in order to withstand chosen plaintext attacks. Such
attacks are easily performed in our scheme because individ-
ual signal samples are usually limited in value (e.g., 8 bit). If
we were to use a nonprobabilistic cryptosystem, this would
enable the buyer to construct a codebook of ciphertexts for
all possible messages (in total, 28 = 256) using the public key
and decrypt through this codebook. Fortunately probabilis-
tic cryptosystems were introduced in [11], which enable the
encryption of a single plaintext to n ciphertexts, where n is
a security parameter related to the size of the key. To which
ciphertext the plaintext is encrypted is dependent on a blind-
ing factor r, which is usually taken at random. Selecting dif-
ferent r’s does not aﬀect the decrypted plaintext. By having
a multitude of ciphertexts for a single plaintext, the size of a
codebook will become 28·2n, and thus impractically large,
preventing such attacks. All the above-mentioned addi-
tive homomorphic-encryption schemes (Paillier, Okamoto-
Uchiyama, and Goldwasser-Micali) are probabilistic, and
hence withstand chosen plaintext attacks.
From Section 3 onwards, we compactly denote the en-
cryption and the decryption of a message with E(m) and
D(c), respectively, omitting the dependency on the random
factor r. In the scope of this paper, an additive homomor-
phic cryptosystem will be used for encrypting signal samples
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which do not necessarily need to be integer values. In this
case, rounding to the nearest integer value precedes the en-
cryption, and thus, in this paper, E(·) denotes both rounding
and encryption.
2.2.1. Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem
Okamoto and Uchiyama [8] proposed a semantically secure
and probabilistic public key cryptosystem based on compos-
ite numbers. Let n = p2q, where p and q are two prime
numbers of length k bits, and let g be a generator such that
the order of g p−1modp2 is p. Another generator is defined as
h = gn. In this scheme, the public key is pk = (n, g,h, k) and
the secret key is sk = (p, q).
Encryption.
A message m (0 < m< 2k−1) is encrypted as follows:
c = E(m, r) = gmhrmod n, (2)
where r is a random number in Z∗n .
Decryption.
Decoding the cipher-text is defined as








where the function L(·) is
L(u) = u− 1
p
. (4)
The Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem has the additive ho-
momorphic property such that, given two encrypted mes-
sages E(m1, r1) and E(m2, r2), the following equality holds:
E(m1, r1)× E(m2, r2) = gm1hr1 × gm2hr2 mod n
= gm1+m2hr1+r2 mod n
= E(m1 + m2, r1 + r2).
(5)
Here, × denotes integer-modulo-n multiplication.
3. KURIBAYASHI AND TANAKA ANONYMOUS
FINGERPRINTING PROTOCOL
The fingerprinting scheme in [5] is carried out between
buyer and merchant, and has, as objective to anonymously
embed, the buyer’s identity information into the merchant’s
data (e.g., audio, image, or video signal). The buyer decom-
poses his l -bit identityW into bits asW = (w0,w1, . . . ,wl−1).
For applications such as embedding identity information in
multimedia data, the value of l is typically between 32 and
128 (bits), which is suﬃciently large to prevent the merchant
from guessing valid buyer ids. Where necessary, we assume
that the probability P[wj = 0] and P[wj = 1] are equal. After
decomposition of W into individual bits, the buyer encrypts
each bit with his public key using the Okamoto-Uchiyama
cryptosystem, so that E(W) = (E(w0),E(w1), . . . ,E(wl−1)).
These encrypted values are sent to the merchant.
The merchant first quantizes the samples of the (audio,
image, and video) signal that the buyer wishes to obtain, us-
ing a quantizer with coarseness 2Δ, that is, x′ = Q2Δ(x). Here,
the quantizer step size Δ is a positive integer to ensure that
the quantized value can be encrypted. He then encrypts all
quantized signal samples x′ with the public key of the buyer,
yielding E(x′). The merchant selects watermark embedding
positions by using a unique secret key that will be used to
extract the watermark from the redistributed copies. In or-
der to embed a single bit of information wj into one of the
quantized and encrypted value E(x′) at a particular water-
mark embedding position, the merchant performs the fol-
lowing operation:
E(y) = E(x′)× E(wj)Δ
= E(x′ + wjΔ). (6)
The result is an encrypted and watermarked signal value y,
as can be readily seen by the following relation:
D(E(y)) = x′ + wjΔ,
y =
{
Q2Δ(x), if wj = 0,
Q2Δ(x) + Δ, if wj = 1.
(7)
The encrypted signal, with the buyer’s identity information
embedded into it in the form of a watermark, is finally sent
to the buyer. Obviously, only the buyer can decrypt the wa-
termarked signal values.
In order for the system to be robust against local attacks,
the relation between the buyer’s identity-information bits wj
and the signal values y (audio samples, image, or video pix-
els), into which the information bits are embedded, should
be kept secret from the buyer. Note that, as a consequence,
all signal values x will have to be encrypted, also the ones
that do not carry a bit wj of the buyer’s identity information,
as so to hide these embedding positions.
Compared to the original QIM scheme in (1), the above
watermarking scheme introduces a bias, as the expected (av-
erage) value of y is Δ/2 larger than that of x. This bias is in-
troduced because Δwj is always added to the quantized signal
value x′ and never subtracted. In order to avoid this undesir-
able side eﬀect, either the even or odd quantizer should be
selected depending on the watermark bit wj as in (1). How-
ever, the merchant has only the encrypted version of each wa-
termark bit wj , which prevents him from deciding between
the two quantizers. To overcome this problem, the merchant
compares the signal values x and x′, and depending on the re-
sult, the encrypted value of Δwj can be added or subtracted
[5]. When x′ is smaller than x, Δwj is added, otherwise, it is
subtracted. This procedure now is equivalent to (1) and thus
eﬀectively removes the bias. As the decision is not depen-
dent on the value of wj , no information is leaked about the
value of wj . The resulting embedding procedure for identity-







)× E(wj)Δ, if x ≥ Q2Δ(x),
E(x′)× (E(wj)Δ)−1, if x < Q2Δ(x), (8)
J. P. Prins et al. 5
where ()−1 denotes modular inverse in the cyclic group de-
fined by the encryption scheme. When the buyer decrypts
the received encrypted and watermarked signal values, he ob-




x′ + wjΔ, if x ≥ Q2Δ(x),
x′ −wjΔ, if x < Q2Δ(x). (9)
For all other positions, the unwatermarked and unchanged,
but encrypted and therefore rounded, signal values x are
transmitted.
In the above embedding protocol, we have assumed that
the buyer provides encrypted values of a valid binary de-
composition (w0,w1, . . . ,wl−1) of his identity information
W to the merchant. Since, however, the decomposed bits
of the identity information of the buyer are encrypted, the
merchant cannot easily check this assumption. In the origi-
nal work by Kuribayashi and Tanaka [5], a registration cen-
ter is used, which assures the legitimacy of the buyer. Dur-
ing the purchase, the merchant first confirms the identity
of the buyer, and then the buyer proves the validity of the
decomposed bits of his identity information by using zero-
knowledge proof protocols. Since this procedure is entirely
independent of the watermarking scheme, we refer, for de-
tails on the identity and decomposition validation and the
security of this procedure, to [5], where it is given for the
Okamoto-Uchiyama encryption scheme. The focus of this
paper is on the application of the homomorphic embedding
procedure described above to the more robust watermarking
schemes of [6, 7].
4. ANONYMOUS FINGERPRINTING USING ADVANCED
WATERMARKING SCHEMES
From the perspective of the merchant, the embedding of
the buyer’s identification information must be as robust as
possible in order to both withstand malicious and benign
signal-processing operations on the fingerprinted signal. If
the buyer id-embedding procedure is not robust, the buyer
could remove the fingerprint either intentionally or uninten-
tionally, and as a consequence, the merchant would lose his
ability to trace illegally redistributed copies. The fingerprints
embedded in the Kuribayashi and Tanaka (KT) anonymous
fingerprinting protocol, described in Section 3, are known to
be sensitive to a number of signal-processing operations, and
are, in fact, relatively easy to remove through attacks men-
tioned in Section 2.1. We propose to increase the robust-
ness of the Kuribayashi and Tanaka anonymous fingerprint-
ing protocol, as perceived by the merchant, by applying their
approach to two advanced quantization-based watermarking
schemes, namely, DC-QIM and RDM.
So far, we have embedded the bits of the identity infor-
mation into signal values without specifying what these sig-
nal values actually are. In the rest of this paper, we will use
block-DCT transform coeﬃcients of images to embed the
identity bits into. A particular block-DCT coeﬃcient, into
which, we embed an information bit wj , will be abstractly
denoted by xi. Of course, in actual images, xi may be a partic-







Figure 2: Subtractive dither QIM.
The relation between the bits wj and watermark embedding
positions xi is determined by a key known only to the mer-
chant. In practical cases of interest, the number of candidate
embedding positions is in the same order as the number of
signal samples, whereas the number of information bits is
typically between 32 and 128. For instance, for a 1024×1024
pixels image, the maximum number of possible embedding
combinations for 128 bits of information is ( 1024
2
128 ), which
provides enough security. In the case of embedding the bits
wj into DCT coeﬃcients, the number of possible embedding
combinations will be smaller depending on the DCT block
size and the number of DCT coeﬃcients in one block that
are (perceptually and qualitatively) suitable for embedding a
watermark bit into.
It is important to note that the goal for each water-
marking scheme within the Kuribayashi-Tanaka protocol is
to compute the encryption of watermarked coeﬃcients yi,
while only having available original signal values xi, the en-
crypted bits E(wj) of the buyer’s decomposed identity, and
the public key pk of the selected additively homomorphic
encryption scheme. Once the buyer identification informa-
tion is correctly embedded in the encrypted domain, the en-
crypted coeﬃcients (i.e., encrypted digital content) will be
sent to the buyer, who can decrypt these with his private key
to obtain correctly watermarked data. Since the information
bits are embedded in the DCT domain, a trivial inverse DCT
on the decrypted data is necessary as the last step to obtain
the purchased digital image. Because this is easiest performed
in the plaintext domain, we leave it to the buyer to perform




Fingerprints embedded by the basic QIM watermarking
scheme used by Kuribayashi and Tanaka as described in
Section 2.1 can be locally attacked because the buyer can find
the embedding positions xi without checking all possible (for
instance ( 1024
2
128 )) combinations. A common solution to this
weakness of the basic QIM watermarking scheme is to add
pseudorandom noise, usually called dither, to xi before em-
bedding an information bit wj , and subtracting the dither
after embedding. As a consequence, the quantization levels
and their constant diﬀerence Δ can no longer be observed,
making the separation between embedding positions xi and
nonembedding positions impossible. The resulting water-
marking scheme, illustrated in Figure 2, is called subtractive
dither QIM (SD-QIM).










Figure 3: Distortion-compensated QIM.
In QIM terminology, a small amount of dither di is added
prior to quantizing the signal amplitude xi to an odd or even
value depending on the information bit wj . After quantiza-
tion of xi+di, the same amount of dither di is subtracted. It is
desirable that the dither can be used in cooperation with the
QIM uniform quantizers QΔ-odd(·) and QΔ-even(·), which use
a quantization step size of 2Δ, as in the basic QIM. It has been
shown [14] that a suitable choice for the PDF of the random
dither di is a uniform distribution on [−Δ,Δ].
In order to embed the buyer’s identity information bit
E(wj) into coeﬃcient xi using the Kuribayashi-Tanaka pro-
tocol in combination with subtractive dither, we carry out
the following protocol.
(i) Add random dither di to the signal sample or coeﬃ-
cient xi.
(ii) Quantize xi + di with a quantization coarseness of 2Δ,
and encrypt the result using the buyer’s public key,
yielding E(Q2Δ(xi + di)).
(iii) Multiply by E(wj)
Δ or its modular inverse depending
on the value of xi + di, in order to achieve the desired
quantization level.
(iv) Encrypt the dither di to obtain E(di). Note that, since
di ∈ R, the encryption operation includes modulo
n rounding to an integer. Multiply the result of the
previous step with the modular inverse of E(di) as so
to implement the subtraction of the dither di from
Q2Δ(xi + di).




E(Q2Δ(xi + di))× E(wj)Δ, if xi ≥ Q2Δ(xi),
E(Q2Δ(xi + di))× (E(wj)Δ)−1, if xi < Q2Δ(xi),
E(yi) = E(ti)× E(di)−1.
(10)
After decryption, the buyer obtains the (DCT transformed)
image, into which, his identity information is embedded in
certain DCT coeﬃcients yi according to the following sub-










)− di, if wj = 1. (11)
The above embedding procedure demonstrates the usage
of the Kuribayashi-Tanaka protocol to subtractive-dither
QIM. The plaintext subtractive-dither QIM and the above
Kuribayashi-Tanaka subtractive-dither QIM (KT SD-QIM)
are equivalent except for the rounding of the dither di to in-
tegers before encryption. How to limit the adverse eﬀect of
integer rounding will be addressed next.
Two improvements of (10) are desirable. In the first
place, we can subtract di before encrypting Q2Δ(xi + di). This
eﬀectively removes the last protocol step, and hence elim-
inates an unnecessary encryption operation. The resulting




E(Q2Δ(xi+di)− di)× E(wj)Δ, if xi ≥ Q2Δ(xi),
E(Q2Δ(xi+di)− di)× (E(wj)Δ)−1, if xi < Q2Δ(xi).
(12)
The second improvement concerns the quantization opera-
tion. The quantizer not only rounds the signal amplitudes
to predetermined (not necessarily integer) quantization lev-
els, but it must also round signal values or DCT coeﬃcients
xi + di to integers because of the ensuing encryption opera-
tion. If the signal values of DCT coeﬃcients xi are suﬃciently
large, using integer-valued coeﬃcients is not a restriction at
all. For smaller values of xi, however, using integer values may
be too restrictive or may yield too large deviations between
the results of (12) and (11).
We propose to circumvent this problem by scaling all co-
eﬃcients xi with a constant factor c before embedding. Scal-
ing has little eﬀect on the en-/decryption, as long as the sam-
ples are not scaled beyond the message group size of the
encryption scheme used. The message group size is, how-
ever, usually very large because of encryption security re-
quirements (typically > 2512). As a consequence of scaling
xi, the dither di and all encrypted bits E(wj) of the decom-
posed identity of the buyer also have to be scaled by c. We
note that scaling introduces extra computation. However, the
dither can be scaled and subtracted before encryption, result-
ing in a very small increase in complexity. The scaling of the
encrypted bits E(wj) of the decomposed identity of the buyer
has to be taken into account in the protocol steps, which is
relatively easy since the scaling can be combined with the
multiplication of wj with Δ. The resulting embedding equa-

















c·(Q2Δ(xi + di)− di))× (E(wj)Δ)−1,






The scaling factor c has to be communicated to the buyer so
that the buyer can rescale the entire image after decryption
to the proper (original) intensity range.
4.2. Distortion-Compensated QIM
Distortion-compensated QIM (DC-QIM) [6] is an extension
to the subtractive dither-QIM scheme described in the previ-
ous section. Rather than directly adding dither to and quan-
tizing of xi, a fraction α·xi is used in the SD-QIM procedure
(see Figure 3). The information bits will be embedded only in
the fraction α·xi, where α lies within the range [0, 1]. The re-
maining fraction (1−α)·xi is added back to the watermarked
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signal component α·xi to form the final embedded coeﬃ-
cient yi. The embedder chooses an appropriate value for α
depending on the desired detection performance and robust-






where σ2w = Δ2/3 is the variance of the watermark in the wa-
termarked signal, and σ2n is the variance of the noise or other
degradation that an attacker applies in an attempt to ren-
der the watermark bits undetectable. Obviously, the standard
SD-QIM scheme is optimal only if an attacker inserts little
or no noise into the watermarked image since, for σ2n→0, we
find α→1. The diﬀerence in robustness between SD-QIM and
DC-QIM becomes especially relevant if the variance of the
attacker becomes large relative to σ2w, that is, σ
2
n→σ2w.
As the diﬀerences between the SD-QIM and DC-QIM
watermarking scheme merely consist of plaintext multiplica-
tions and ciphertext additions, DC-QIM can also be achieved
within the limitations of the homomorphic additive encryp-
tion scheme used by the Kuribayashi-Tanaka protocol. The




E(Q2Δ(α·xi + di)− di)× E(wj)Δ,
if α·xi ≥ Q2Δ(α·xi),
E(Q2Δ(α·xi + di)− di)× (E(wj)Δ)−1,
if α·xi < Q2Δ(α·xi),
E(yi) = E(ti)× E((1− α)·xi).
(15)











)− di −wj·Δ, if α·xi ≥ Q2Δ(α·xi),
yi = ti + (1− α)·xi.
(16)
The plaintext distortion-compensated QIM and the above
Kuribayashi-Tanaka distortion-compensated QIM (KT DC-
QIM) are equivalent, except again for the rounding of the
real-valued dither di and (1−α)·xi to integers before encryp-
tion.
Similar to the subtractive dither-QIM watermark algo-
rithm, KT DC-QIM can be modified to subtract the dither
before encryption, and to scale the signal values before en-
cryption. Furthermore, the term (1 − α)·xi can be added
before encryption, further reducing the number of encryp-







c·(Q2Δ(α·xi + di)− di))× E(wj)Δ,







c·(Q2Δ(α·xi + di)− di))× (E(wj)Δ)−1,





















Figure 4: Rational dither modulation.
4.3. Rational dither modulation
DC-QIM provides a significant improvement in robustness
compared to the basic QIM scheme. Nevertheless, the DC-
QIM scheme is known to be very sensitive to gain or volu-
metric attacks, which is just simply scaling of the image in-
tensities. Because of the use of the scaling factor c in SD-QIM
and DC-QIM in order to reduce the sensitivity to integer-
rounding before encryption, the buyer has an excellent op-
portunity to perform a gain attack on the watermarked sig-
nal. The gain eﬀect causes the quantization levels used at the
detector to be misaligned with those embedded in the pur-
chased and illegally distributed digital data, eﬀectively mak-
ing the retrieval of the watermarked identity bits impossible
[16].
Perez-Gonzalez et al. [7], proposed the usage of QIM on
ratios between signal samples as so to make the watermark-
ing system robust against fixed gain attacks. The resulting ap-
proach, known as rational dither modulation (RDM), is ro-
bust against both additive-noise and fixed-gain attacks. The
RDM-embedding scheme is illustrated in Figure 4. The ro-
bustness against fixed gain attacks is achieved by normalizing
the signal value (or DCT coeﬃcient) xi by v(Yi−1), which is
a function that combines L previous watermarked signal val-
ues Yi−1 = (yi−1, yi−2, . . . , yi−L). An example for the function










The SD-QIM watermark embedding will then take place us-

































if wj = 1,
(19)
where the multiplication of the quantization results with
v(Yi−1) is required to scale the coeﬃcients to their original
value range. Another way of viewing RDM is that it is equiv-
alent to using SD-QIM with a signal amplitude-dependent
quantization coarseness v(Yi−1)·Δ.
The normalization of xi takes place on a function of
(yi−1, yi−2, . . . , yi−L) rather than of (xi−1, xi−2, . . . , xi−L). The
usage of v(Yi−1) is preferable because only the watermarked
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values yi are available during watermark detection. In the
Kuribayashi-Tanaka protocol, the watermarked signal values
or DCT coeﬃcients yi are only available to the merchant in
an encrypted form E(yi). Unfortunately, the embedder can-
not make use of v(Yi−1) as a normalization factor, primarily
because the homomorphic division (and multiplication for
that matter) is not defined for two encrypted values in a ho-
momorphic additive-encryption scheme. Also the evaluation
of the normalization function v(Yi−1) (e.g., (18)) may not be
computable on encrypted values.
Consequently, we will have to use the original sig-
nal/coeﬃcient values (xi−1, xi−2, . . . , xi−L), which will have
the same statistics as (yi−1, yi−2, . . . , yi−L) for suﬃciently large
value of L. Experimental results have shown that an appro-
priate value of L is 25. For this value of L, the detection re-
sults, using normalization on v(Xi−1), are suﬃciently close to
the results based on normalization using v(Yi−1).
Since RDM applies QIM on the ratio xi/v(Xi−1), atten-
tion should be paid to the integer rounding process. Since
xi/v(Xi−1) will usually be around (the real number) 1.0, the
rounding to an integer will almost always yield (the integer)
1, introducing unacceptably large watermarking distortions.
Therefore, the scaling of the ratio with a factor c becomes
essential in RDM. Furthermore, after quantization of the ra-
tio xi/v(Xi−1), the result needs to be multiplied with v(Xi−1).
Thanks to the homomorphic property, this can be carried
out by an exponentiation in modulo arithmetic with v(Xi−1)
in the encrypted domain. To this end, obviously v(Xi−1) has
to be an integer, requiring another rounding step. In case this
rounding eﬀect is severe, another scaling can be carried out
on v(Xi−1). Since, in our experiments, this eﬀect showed to
be negligible, we do not consider scaling of v(Xi−1) itself. We
denote the rounded value of v(Xi−1) by vint(Xi−1).
Using again the notation di for the uniformly distributed
































































With the above scheme, we have succeeded in adapting
the RDM watermarking scheme, one of the most recent
QIM watermarking approaches, to the constraints set by the
Kuribayashi-Tanaka protocol.
5. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section, we experimentally compare the plain-
text versions of the SD-QIM, DC-QIM, and RDM wa-
termarking schemes with the proposed version based on
the Kuribayashi-Tanaka fingerprinting protocol. The buyer’s
Table 2: Table of parameters.
Algorithm Scaling factor Quantization step size Noise
SD-QIM c = 1, 2, 5, 10, 100 Δ = k for k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 20
DC-QIM c = 1, 10, 100 Δ = 5k for k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 20 σn = 15
RDM
c = 10 Δ = k for k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 20 σn = 15
c = 100 Δ = k for k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 20
c = 1000 Δ = 8k for k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 20
c = 10.000 Δ = 75k for k, 1 ≤ k ≤ 20
identity information will be embedded into the DC DCT co-
efficients of 8 × 8 blocks. Per image, we embed 64 bits of
identity information into 64 DC DCT coeﬃcients that are
pseudorandomly selected based on a secret key only known
to the merchant. In all experiments, we use the 256 × 256
pixels gray-valued Lena and Baboon images. Because of run-
time eﬃciency and the availability of the necessary proofs,
we selected the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem for all ex-
periments as in [5]. The Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem
has a smaller encryption rate compared to (generalized ver-
sions of) Paillier because of a smaller message space for the
same security level. However, as signal values are usually
sampled with 8 bit precision, a smaller message space is not
a problem for our application, while the ciphertext size is re-
duced with the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem, resulting
in lower overall computational complexity.
We not only compare the performance of the plaintext
and ciphertext versions of the SD-QIM, DC-QIM, and RDM
watermarking schemes, but we also evaluate the eﬀect of in-
teger rounding and the scaling parameter c on the perfor-
mance. In our graphs, each point shown is based on 100 mea-
surements, and each measurement is a complete, new itera-
tion of the Kuribayashi-Tanaka protocol. A table of parame-
ters1 for algorithms can be found in Table 2.
5.1. Subtractive dither QIM
An important performance measure of a watermarking
scheme is the bit-error rate (BER) of the watermark detector
as a function of the strength of embedding the watermark.
The BER is a measure that quantifies the probability Pe of
incorrectly detecting a single bit of information. Usually, the
buyer’s identity information contains some form of channel
coding so that the buyer’s identity can still be retrieved even
if a few bits are incorrectly detected from the fingerprinted
image, this is further discussed in Section 6.
In order to measure the distortion that the watermark
introduces into the host signal, we use the document-to-
watermark ratio (DWR):






1 The codes for the implementation can be found in http://ict.ewi.tudelft
.nl.
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Figure 5: SD-QIM bit error rate (BER) Pe as a function of the document-to-watermark ratio (DWR) for the original SD-QIM scheme and
KT SD-QIM with diﬀerent scaling factors c = 1, 2, 5, 10, and 100 for (a) Lena and (b) Baboon images.
Here, σ2x is the variance of the data, into which the water-
mark is embedded, which, in our case, are the DC DCT co-
eﬃcients of 8×8 blocks. Further, σ2w is the variance of the
distortion caused by the embedded watermark. Following
[6], we equate σ2w = Δ2/3. The objective, a watermarking
scheme, is to have a low BER with a high DWR. The proper
values for the DWR and thus Δ is application and data de-
pendent. In this paper, we are not concerned with select-
ing a suitable value of Δ. We rather study the behavior of
the BER as a function of the DWR for the plaintext and
Kuribayashi-Tanaka versions of the SD-QIM watermarking
scheme.
Figure 5 shows the BER-DWR relation for the two ver-
sions of the SD-QIM algorithm. The performance of the
Kuribayashi-Tanaka version of the SD-QIM (KT SD-QIM)
watermarking scheme is shown for several values of the scal-
ing factor c. Although there is no deliberate attack performed
on the watermark, the inverse DCT transform, and conse-
quential rounding to 8 bit pixel values introduces a distor-
tion into the fingerprinted signal. The robustness of the wa-
termarking scheme is suﬃcient, however, to result in no-bit
errors at a DWR of 31–34 dB. A peculiar eﬀect is the in-
creased robustness of the heavily rounded (i.e., scaling fac-
tor c = 1) KT SD-QIM compared to the original water-
marking scheme. We believe that this behavior is caused by
the distorting eﬀect of the (inverse) DCT transform. By in-
creasing the scaling factor c, we can approximate the per-
formance of the original SD-QIM. The performance is al-
ready closely approximated with c = 100 in this instance,
but in general, the application, the data, and the implemen-
tation of the DCT will determine which value of c is required
to approximate the performance of the plaintext SD-QIM
scheme.
5.2. Distortion-Compensated QIM
Figure 5 showed the BER in a scenario without any explicit
attacks on the watermark. Distortion-compensated QIM can
be used to provide optimal robustness against additive noise
attacks. Therefore, we will show the performance of the
Kuribayashi-Tanaka adaptation of DC-QIM and compare it
with the original DC-QIM and the previously discussed SD-
QIM. A measure of the amount of noise introduced relative
to the strength of the watermark is the watermark-to-noise
ratio (WNR):






Here, σ2n is the variance of the additive zero-mean Gaussian
noise that the attacker adds to the fingerprinted content. The
value of α is chosen according to (14) so that the DC-QIM
scheme is tuned for a specific additive noise-variance level.
In all our experiments, we use σn = 15 and change the value
of Δ = √3σw as so to obtain a varying WNR.
Figure 6 shows the BER-WNR relation for SD-QIM and
DC-QIM. We choose to fix the amount of additive noise in-
stead of the DWR because we are interested in the eﬀect the
scaling factor c has on the required embedding strength (i.e.,
value of Δ and thus the watermark power) and not a variable
amount of additive noise. Therefore, Figure 6 cannot be eas-
ily compared to other literature on watermark robustness. As
in our previous experiment, the watermark distortion is cal-
culated using the expression σ2w = Δ2/3 [6].
As can be observed, the performance of the DC-QIM is
better than SD-QIM with additive noise, which is in accor-
dance with [6]. We are mostly concerned with the compari-
son of the original version of the DC-QIM scheme and the
10 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
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Figure 6: SD-QIM and DC-QIM bit error rate (BER) as a function of the watermark-to-noise ratio (WNR) with additive noise (σn = 15)
for the original SD-QIM and DC-QIM schemes and the KT SD-QIM and DC-QIM schemes with diﬀerent scaling factors c for (a) Lena and
(b) Baboon images.
Kuribayashi-Tanaka adaptation of DC-QIM. As expected,
the performance of the original DC-QIM scheme and the
Kuribayashi-Tanaka adaptation of DC-QIM (KT DC-QIM)
diﬀer very little. Also the scaling factor c has little eﬀect on
the BER. This can be explained by the fact that the additive
noise dominates the errors caused by the integer rounding.
5.3. Rational dither modulation
Unlike the previous two watermarking schemes, rational
dither modulation (RDM) depends on a suﬃciently large
scaling factor c in order to achieve a quantization coarseness
Δ lower than 1. The scaling factor c determines the possi-
ble resolution of Δ. We are interested to see which resolution
is required in order to achieve good performance. Although
the results depend on the data and the strength of the added
noise, the trend of these results will be observed for other
cases and data as well because the signal coeﬃcients xi are
normalized before embedding.
Figure 7 shows the bit error rate (BER) performance of
RDM as a function of the watermark-to-noise ratio (WNR)
for the plain text and Kuribayashi-Tanaka versions of RDM.
The diﬀerent curves reflect diﬀerent values for the scaling
factor c. Because of the complexity of the analytical expres-
sion of the watermark distortion σ2w in [7], we measured the
watermark distortion directly from the data.
Figure 7 shows that the value of the scaling factor c deter-
mines the points of the Pe-WNR curve, which are attainable
by the Kuribayashi-Tanaka RDM scheme. With a scaling fac-
tor c = 10, only WNRs with 12 dB or higher are reachable
(see “KT RDM, c = 10” curve in Figure 7, which starts at
12 dB), allowing for very little flexibility in choosing the op-
timal embedding strength for a specific application. A scaling
factor of 100 performs much better, but 1000 approximates
the original RDM closely.
Besides the equivalent robustness to additive-noise at-
tacks of RDM compared to SD-QIM, RDM is robust against
amplitude-scaling attacks. Figure 8 shows the robustness of
SD-QIM, DC-QIM, and RDM to a performed amplitude-
scaling attack. SD-QIM and DC-QIM, show a high vulner-
ability against amplitude-scaling attacks. At a small gain fac-
tor ρ of 1.05, approximately 50 percent of the buyer’s identi-
fying information cannot be retrieved correctly, while RDM
is robust throughout the whole range for the gain factor. Al-
though theoretically RDM should not be at all aﬀected by an
amplitude-scaling attack, some bit errors start to show up at
gain factors larger than 1.06. These are inherent to the 8 bit
data-representation format, which easily overflows for large
gain factors.
6. SECURITY ASPECTS OF BUYER IDENTITY
As fingerprint detection is a signal processing operation, de-
tected fingerprints will usually be distorted even without at-
tacks on the fingerprint by a malicious buyer, as discussed
in Section 4. The fingerprint can, for instance, be distorted
by perfectly legitimate signal-processing operations such as
compression, the obligatory inverse DCT, and consequential
rounding. In this scenario, the merchant would normally not
be able to present a perfectly retrieved buyer id. The regis-
tration center could accept merchant buyer id submissions,
which are similar to a correct buyer id. However, the security
of the buyer depends on the inability of the merchant to guess
a correct buyer id. To allow the merchant to submit similar
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Figure 7: RDM bit error rate (BER) as a function of the watermark-to-noise ratio (WNR) with additive noise (σn = 15) for the original
RDM scheme and KT RDM scheme with diﬀerent scaling factors c for (a) Lena and (b) Baboon images.












Figure 8: KT bit error rate (BER) as a function of the gain factor
(ρ) for KT SD-QIM, KT DC-QIM and KT RDM schemes with c =
1000. The DWR is fixed to 7.1 dB. Datapoints below a BER of 10−3
are plotted for visualization, but in reality 0.
buyer ids and for the registration center to accept these would
thus harm the buyer’s security.
By letting the registration center extend the buyer id with
a forward-error-correcting scheme, the merchant can com-
pensate for a small and fixed maximum number of bit errors
in the buyer id. This is of course equivalent to increasing the
size of the buyer id and allowing for a small number of bit er-
rors at the registration center. This approach has the advan-
tage that it moves the computational complexity of the error
correction from the registration center to the merchant.
There is a choice to be made concerning the locations of
the embedding positions for each buyer. The embedding po-
sitions can be changed for each buyer, but this would not
provide any real benefits to the robustness of the total fin-
gerprinting scheme other than that colluding buyers would
have to compare their individual fingerprinted version with
a number of other versions in order to detect the embedding
locations. If the embedding locations are identical for each
fingerprinted copy, buyers who have located these embed-
ding positions could publish these, and all buyers could then
remove the fingerprint from their copy. Using unique em-
bedding positions for each buyer has, however, a big disad-
vantage upon detection. As with any fingerprinting scheme,
the merchant cannot know the used embedding positions be-
fore detection, as the detection procedure is the sole method
to discriminate between copies. The unavailability of the em-
bedding positions prevents the merchant from detecting the
buyer id, resulting in a deadlock. In order to break this dead-
lock, the merchant could estimate the embedding positions
by using a nonblind detection procedure (e.g., subtract the
original image from the encountered image and thus find
the most likely candidate embedding locations, as they will
show up to have a high diﬀerence to the original signal) or
by embedding a pilot signal to identify the used embedding
positions. However, this would be ineﬀective for heavily at-
tacked copies, which are heavily distorted by attacks. Another
way to retrieve the correct buyer id is to let the merchant
detect for all possible embedding locations and use a (soft)
error-correction scheme to determine the most likely buyer
id, based on the distance, the detected id is from a valid code-
word in the used error-correction scheme. This, however,
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makes the detection procedure linear in complexity related
to the number of buyers as it has to be performed for each
used combination of embedding positions.
Although dithering prevents an individual buyer to de-
tect the embedding positions, a coalition of buyers can col-
lude to find them. By comparing diﬀerent fingerprinted
copies, the coalition can locate the diﬀering samples and co-
eﬃcients and, as the fingerprint embedding is the predomi-
nant cause of these diﬀering samples, consequently, the em-
bedding positions. This vulnerability can be eliminated by
constructing the buyer’s ids through the scheme of Boneh
and Shaw [17], making them collusion secure. The collusion
security of the scheme of Boneh and Shaw depends on gen-
erating buyer ids such that they have a number of identical
bits wj for any colluding coalition of c buyers. Because these
buyer id bits are identical, the coalition is not able to detect
these embedded bits by comparing their individually finger-
printed copies. This does, however, require that the embed-
ding positions are identical for each fingerprinted copy. Be-
cause the embedding positions for these bits cannot be deter-
mined, they are safe from targeted attacks and can therefore
be detected correctly by the merchant even after the attack by
the colluding buyer coalition. Constructing such a collusion-
secure code for a large coalition constitutes a large increase in
the buyer id length. As shown in [17], the length is equal to
O(c4 log (N/e) log (1/e)), where c is the number of colluding
buyers, N is the total number of buyers, and e is the proba-
bility that the cheating buyer cannot be retrieved after a col-
lusion attack. Because of the anonymity of the embedding
procedure, the registration center will have to generate the
collusionsecure buyer ids as this will be the only person the
merchant trusts to generate a valid buyer id.
7. CONCLUSION
In conventional fingerprinting schemes, the buyer’s identity
is known to the merchant during embedding. This knowl-
edge can be easily abused by a malicious merchant by cre-
ating fingerprinted copies containing this identity informa-
tion without the buyer’s consent. After distribution, the mer-
chant can claim a license violation for this specific buyer. To
deal with this problem, Kuribayashi and Tanaka proposed a
reasonably eﬃcient solution in [5] based on embedding the
buyer identification information using additive homomor-
phic encryption schemes. The problem of the proposed pro-
tocol in [5] is the vulnerability of the underlying basic QIM
watermarking scheme, which is fragile to simple attacks like
amplitude scaling and allows for the detection of the embed-
ding positions. Therefore, we have proposed to adapt DC-
QIM and RDM techniques to the anonymous fingerprinting
scheme of Kuribayashi and Tanaka.
We have adapted DC-QIM and RDM techniques, which
hide the embedding locations, unlike basic QIM, because
they are based on SD-QIM. They perform provably equiv-
alent (RDM) or better (DC-QIM) than the watermark-
ing scheme in the original work against additive-noise at-
tacks. Furthermore, RDM provides robustness to amplitude-
scaling attacks which is a major drawback of the basic QIM
scheme used in [5].
Although rounding errors can be made arbitrarily small
through the use of scaling factors, the practical need, as
shown in the experiments, is small. As integer quantization
step sizes have to be used because of the homomorphic en-
cryption scheme, the distortion introduced by the finger-
print embedding is usually larger than the distortion intro-
duced by integer rounding. As a consequence, rounding with
a scaling factor of one (i.e., no scaling) already has accept-
able performance. The scaling factor has its use, however, in
increasing the eﬀective quantizer resolution. Although this is
of limited use for signals with a relatively large value range, it
is essential for signals with a small value range, as is the case
for RDM after normalization.
Due to attacks on the digital content or transmission er-
rors, the identity information of the buyer can be extracted
with bit errors. In that case, using error-correction codes
can improve the abilities of the merchant to recover the
identity information. By letting the registration center se-
lect the buyer identity information, we can incorporate these
error-correction capabilities or even provide a collusionse-
cure fingerprinting scheme. This greatly increases the em-
bedded buyer’s identification information and the complex-
ity of constructing a valid identity at the registration cen-
ter. Although this might not be practical in real applications,
it provides a theoretical solution to the problem of collu-
sion.
By adapting the DC-QIM and RDM watermarking
schemes to the anonymous fingerprinting protocol of Kurib-
ayashi and Tanaka, we increased the robustness of the em-
bedded fingerprints, while preserving the anonymity of the
fingerprinting protocol. Consequently, the buyer’s ability to
successfully attack embedded fingerprints is reduced, in-
creasing the deterrence to the illegal redistribution of digital
content.
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